Even as the World Bank and the G-20 nations have placed Public Private Partnerships (PPP’s or P3’s) at the top of their agenda as a model for building infrastructure in the new millennium, the new Government of Guyana, by its precipitate actions on the Berbice Bridge which pioneered the use of the model, is destroying this option for our now investment-starved and stagnant economy. The P3 model came into vogue in the 1990’s. As explained simply by Wikipedia, “There are usually two fundamental drivers for P3’s. Firstly, P3’s are claimed to enable the Public Sector to harness the expertise and efficiencies that the Private Sector can bring to the delivery of certain facilities and services traditionally procured and delivered by the Public Sector. Secondly, a P3 is structured so that the Public Sector body seeking to make a capital investment does not incur any borrowing. Rather, the P3 borrowing is incurred by the Private Sector vehicle implementing the project.” As is implicit in the explication above, the PPP model tries to combine the provision of a “public good” – such as a river crossing – which is normally delivered by Government from funds collected as taxes from the citizenry with funding sourced through the “market-driven” Private Sector. In 2006 when the Berbice Bridge was conceptualised as a P3 model, the IMF had raised the question of the still high debt load, inherited from the People’s National Congress, carried by Guyana. When as in the Bridge or a hydro electric plant the services would be paid for by the end user, it becomes an off balance sheet method for Government spending. The Government would not add to its debt portfolio. The International Monetary Fund explicitly commended the P3 model, also floated for a hydro-electric plant, at the time. What has not been commented on presently is the tremendous achievement of the then People’s Progressive Party/Civic Government to bring aboard almost every financial institution in the country – and several commercial ones along with pensions funds – to finance a venture via a P3 Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that was never tested before in the country. Eight years after our Berbice Bridge was built using the P3 financing model, in the wake of the recently concluded Ministerial G-20 meeting, the OECD had advised on the necessary complexity of the arrangement. It pointed out that the World Bank has just issued a “Report on Recommended P3 Contractual Provisions”, which recommends language to address key issues that emerge when countries have to negotiate a PPP contract, including transparency and dispute resolution. This issue about “lack of transparency” has been raised in Guyana on the contract between the SPV (Berbice Bridge Company Inc) and the Government but even the World Bank points out in its Report that because of the involvement of private investors in P3’s, there will have to be broad areas of redactions including commercially sensitive information, trade secrets and strategic/public interest related confidential information. Because private investors prefer liquid investments (or those that could be easily made liquid) there is great reluctance to enter into P3’s that would tie up their money for decades. The inducement in 2007 for investors in the Berbice Bridge would have been to offer higher than then prevailing interest rates. Interestingly, all the investors, including common shareholders accepted, then prevailing rates. Patriotism must have overcome financial prudence. The OECD has now moved from its recommendation last year that the aversion to P3’s can be for governments to “mitigate” risks by transferring them to the Public Sector away from the Private Sector. While in Guyana, this move would be condemned by the present Government, this year the OECD has been even more radical in advising governments to consider “credit and revenue guarantees, first loss provisions [that limit the amount the investor will lose if things go wrong], public subsidies, and … direct loans” to reduce the risks for institutional investors.